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Question in Deterrence Research*
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the deterrent effect of the celerity of the death
penalty on homicide rates. Although in recent years there have been a number
of investigations of the certainty of execution and deterrence, the effect of
celerity of execution has not been examined empirically. As a result, we can
only speculate about the merit of the deterrence hypothesis for the celerity of
executions, and how previous deterrence and death penalty investigations may
be biased due to celerity being ignored.
The deterrent effect of the certainty and celerity of the death penalty on
homicide rates is examined cross-sectionally for states. Multiple measures
of execution and homicide rates are considered, along with various socio
demographic variables in investigating the possible spuriousness of the find
ings. Analysis consistently fails to provide support for the deterrence argument
for the certainty and celerity of executions. Rather, the results fall well within
the pattern of negative findings of over five decades of deterrence and death
penalty research in the United States.
In response to the growing recognition of the limitations of the early studies
of the deterrent effect of the death penalty (Bye; Kirkpatrick; Schuessler;
Sellin a, b; Sutherland; Void) a number of investigations of this important
question have been published in the last few years (Bailey, a, b, c, d; Black
and Orsagh; Bowers and Pierce; Ehrlich; Forst; Passell; Passell and Taylor;
Yunker). Although the recent studies have addressed some important
questions, and have played a part in a number of recent death penalty
cases brought before the United States Supreme Court, they have not
settled the deterrence controversy. 1 Rather, these recent investigations have
"The research reported here was in part supported by funds granted to the Institute for
Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
The conclusions expressed here are those of the author. An earlier version of this article,
under the same title, appeared as a discussion paper ( #532-78) at the Institute for Research
on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Copies are available by writing the author or
the Institute.

brought some writers to opposite conclusions, and have raised additional
questions about deterrence and the death penalty (Gibbs, a, b). One of
these questions, and the issue examined here, is the extent to which theresults of these recent studies might be biased due to neglect of the deterrent
effect of the celerity of executions.
Dating back to the writings of Beccaria and Bentham, proponents of
deterrence have argued that in order for legal sanctions to be effective
deterrents to crime, they must be (1) severe, (2) administered with certainty,
(3) administered swiftly (celerity), and (4) administered publicly. The presumed importance of the celerity of punishment is illustrated by Beccaria:
An immediate punishment is more useful; because the smaller the interval of time
between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will be the
association of the two ideas of "crime" and punishment; so that they may be
considered, one as the cause, and the other as the unavoidable and necessary
effect. ... Delaying the punishment serves only to separate these two ideas, and
thus affects the minds of the spectators rather as being a terrible sight than the necessary consequences of a crime, the horror of which should contribute to heighten
the idea of punishment. (75-6; emphasis added).

Similarly, in a more recent discussion, Jeffery also emphasizes the importance of the celerity and certainty of sanctions as deterrents. For example,
in accounting for the negative evidence for the death penalty he argues:
The uncertainty of capital punishment is one major factor in the system. Another
factor is the time element. A consequence [the death penalty] must be applied
immediately if it is to be effective .... The lesson to be learned from capital punishment is not that punishment does not deter, but that the improper and sloppy use
of punishment does not deter or rehabilitate (299).

Because death penalty investigators have failed to consider the celerity of executions, we can only speculate about the deterrent effectiveness
of this dimension of punishment. In addition, if celerity is an important
deterrent to murder, then ignoring this factor may have biased the findings
in previous investigations of the severity (imprisonment versus execution)
and certainty (execution rates) of the death penalty. As Black and Orsagh
point out, by their (and others') failure to include the celerity of punishment in their deterrence model, results for the sanction variables that were
considered may be biased against confirming the neoclassical hypothesis;
parameter estimates for the sanction variables will be biased if some important variable(s) is excluded from the model.2
I, too, can only speculate about the deterrent effect of the celerity of
executions on murder, and how ignoring this factor may have led to biased
results in previous investigations. Proponents of deterrence may be correct
about celerity, for as Geerken and Gove argue, "the greater the speed with
which punishment occurs (the brevity of the reaction time), the greater the

effectiveness of the deterrence system" (500). On the other hand, the celerity of the death penalty may have little-to-no deterrent value for murder:
Surely it is difficult to see how, in the case of general deterrence, a short time
interval between an offense and the punishment of an alleged offender increases
the deterrent impact on others. Thus on reading that someone has been executed
for first-degree rape, why would the reader be deterred more (assuming any impact
at all) if the alleged rape took place a year ago rather than two years ago? (Gibbs, b,
289).

In addition, Gibbs further argues, "why would he or she [the would-be
offender] be deterred more if the crime took place six weeks rather than
one year previously?" (a, 9}. Although skeptical, Gibbs does concede,
however, that the celerity hypothesis does warrant investigation. 3
The present research is a partial replication and extension of a number of
investigations. Consistent with most studies, I examine the deterrence hypothesis of a significant inverse relationship between states' homicide rates
and (1) the certainty of execution for homicide, (2) the certainty of imprisonment for homicide, and (3) the severity of imprisonment for homicide. In
addition, I also examine the deterrence hypothesis of (4) a significant positive relationship between the celerity of the death penalty-the elapsed
time between the sentencing and execution of convicted murderers-and
homicide rates; the greater the elapsed time between sentencing and execution of convicted murderers, the higher the homicide rate.
Analysis is solely confined to death penalty states because it makes
no theoretical sense to talk about celerity of executions in abolitionist jurisdictions. Further, by limiting the analysis to these states, it will be possible
to examine the relative deterrent effect of both imprisonment and the death
penalty. In addition, by incorporating the celerity of executions, it will be
possible to examine how the exclusion of this variable might have biased
previous studies.
As in previous investigations, sociodemographic factors are considered to control for the possible spuriousness of the sanction-offense
rate relationship. For reasons discussed later, analysis is confined to a
cross-state examination of the deterrence question for 1960.
Review of the Literature

Beginning in the mid-1970s a handful of multivariate analyses of deterrence and the death penalty began to appear in criminology, economics,
and law journals. In Ehrlich's research, widely publicized, the relationship
between certainty of execution and homicide rates was examined longitudinally for the period 1933 to 1969; simultaneously, sociodemographic and
law enforcement factors were considered as control variables. Using na-

tionally aggregated data for these years, Ehrlich's analysis led him to condude that "an additional execution per year over the period in question
may have resulted, on average, in seven to eight fewer murders" (414).
Ehrlich's findings have been challenged on a number of grounds.
First, he failed to differentiate between retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions in estimating annual probabilities of execution, which of course, is
misleading since the probability of execution in abolitionist states is zero.
Second, the validity of his findings rests on the assumption that the form
of the relationship between executions and homicides is the same from
1933 to 1969. Examinations of this question for varying periods between
1933 and 1969 led both Bowers and Pierce and Passell and Taylor to reject
the assumption of temporal homogeneity. Third, for each year 1933 to
1969, Ehrlich aggregated his execution, homicide, and control variables on
a national level. Such a procedure obviously does not take into consideration the substantial state to state variation in (1) levels of homicide (in
both types of states), (2) execution practices (in retentionist jurisdictions),
and (3) the sociodemographic factors used as control variables. Because
of these and other difficulties, Passell and Taylor conclude that Ehrlich's
research has to be viewed with extreme skepticism, and "it is prudent
neither to accept nor reject the hypothesis that capital punishment deters
murder" (12).
In another recent investigation, Yunker examined the executionoffense rate relationship by (1) using an alternative measure of certainty of
execution-the actual number of executions per year for periods from 1933
to 1972, (2) considering only unemployment as a control variable, and (3)
considering a zero and three-year time lag between executions and homicides. His research provides support for the deterrence hypothesis. For the
period 1960 to 1972 (the execution-homicide rate relationship is positive,
or low-negative, for more extended periods), he reports a significant inverse relationship between executions and homicide rates for the threeyear lag model, and concludes that "one execution will deter 156 murders"
(65). Nonlagged execution rates and homicide rates were not significantly
related.
Yunker's research suffers from the same objections raised about
Ehrlich's study: (1) he aggregated his data on a national level; and (2) he
failed to differentiate between abolitionist and retentionist jurisdictions. In
addition, he chooses to ignore his less conclusive findings for the period
1933 to 1959.
In a third investigation, Forst examined changes in execution and
homicide rates from 1960 to 1970 cross-sectionally for states, with sodademographic and imprisonment data being considered as control variables.
Exploring a number of execution-homicide models, he consistently reports
a nonsignificant relationship between executions and homicides. He did
find, however, changes in the certainty of imprisonment for homicide from

1960 (41.3 percent) to 1970 (34.6 percent) to be significantly related to
changes in homicide rates ( +53percent) between these years. Forst concludes that this factor, along with the increased affluence during the 1960s,
is the major contributor to the increase in homicide during the decade.
In two final studies of note, Bailey (d) and Black and Orsagh examined the relationship between the certainty of execution and homicide
rates for 1950 and 1960 cross-sectionally for states. For neither year does
either of these studies provide support for the deterrence argument. Both
Bailey and Black and Orsagh find execution and homicide rates to be positively related. In contrast, findings for the severity and certainty of imprisonment are much less consistent in each investigation, with the coefficients
varying in sign, size, and level of significance for different years, and
sanction-offense rate models. Bailey and Black and Orsagh agree, however, that they find no evidence consistent with the deterrence argument
for the death penalty.
The above research fails to provide an altogether consistent pattern
of findings. With the exception of the Ehrlich and Yunker studies, analyses
have failed to detect a substantial inverse relationship between execution
and homicides rates. Typically, these two variables have been found to be
either positively, or only slightly negatively associated. In addition, because
of the difficulties with the Ehrlich and Yunker studies, their contrary findings have to be viewed with extreme caution. However, and as Bailey and
Orsagh point out, until the celerity of the death penalty is considered as a
deterrent to murder, the negative findings resulting from recent investigations will also have to be viewed with caution.
Methods and Procedures
The deterrence effect of the certainty and celerity of execution, and the
certainty and severity of imprisonment on state homicide rates is examined
to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the deterrence question. Multiple measures of the certainty of execution and homicide rates are investigated and a variety of sociodemographic factors are considered as control
variables.
HOMICIDE RATES

In the absence of theoretically appropriate figures for first-degree murder,
F.B.I. figures for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter are used as an
indicator of capital homicide rates. Because this homicide category includes
all felonious homicides, and is thus more inclusive than first-degree murder, it must be assumed that the ratio of capital to total criminal homicides

is constant from state to state, so that F. B.l. figures provide a reasonably
good indicator of capital offenses. 4
Despite the widespread use ofF. B.l. figures in death penalty investigations, the bias resulting from this practice remains unknown, for no one
has succeeded in accurately counting the capital offenses hidden in these
data (Bedau; Gibbs, a, b; Sellin, a). The bias may not be substantial, however, for Bailey (a, b, c) reports similar findings for certainty of execution
when F.B.I. figures and prison admission figures for first-degree murder
are used as indicators of capital homicide rates. 5 In addition, it can be
argued that the death penalty may also have a deterrent effect for other
forms of criminal homicide. As Caldwell points_ out, the fact that society
so condemns murder that it demands the life of the offender "helps to
engender attitudes of dislike, contempt, disgust, and even horror of these
acts, and thus contributes to the development of personal forces hostile to
crime" (425-6).
CERTAINTY OF EXECUTION

Three measures of certainty of execution are considered. First, execution
rates were computed by dividing the number of executions for homicide
during the year by the number of reported criminal homicides during the
year. This procedure resulted in an execution rate value for each state that
could range from zero to unity. This execution measure is based on the
assumption that the general public, including would-be killers, is more
affected (deterred) by its impression of current levels of homicide and
executions than by the current level of homicides and future executions,
and/or previous homicides and the current level of executions.
Second, if the public is sensitive to the typical delay of at least one
year between the commission of murder and execution, then it makes
sense to take a time lag into account. A second execution rate measure was
constructed by dividing the number of executions for murder during the
year (year t) by the number of reported homicides for the previous year
(year t-1).
A third execution rate measure was computed by dividing the average number of executions for a three-year consecutive period ((yr. t-1
+yr. t + yr. t+1)/3) by the number of reported homicides for year t. This
operationalization has some advantages over the above indexes (Forst). If
the public has only a vague notion of the level of executions during any
particular year, then it makes more sense to compute execution rates by
comparing the level of homicides during year t with the level of executions
for that year and neighboring years. Second, due to the small number of
executions during 1960, measurement error and sampling variability can
be reduced by considering the mean number of executions for a three-year

period. For each certainty of execution measure, execution rates were
converted from proportions into percentages in the analysis presented in
Tables 2-9.
CELERITY OF EXECUTION

In examining the celerity of the death penalty, ideally one would like to
consider the time intervals both between the commission of murder and
executions, and between sentencing and executions. Unfortunately, published data for either measure are not available. Thanks to the assistance
of the National Prisoners Statistics Branch of the Bureau of the Census,
however, I was able to secure unpublished data for the median elapsed
time in months between the sentence of death and execution of convicted
murderers from 1956 to 1960. 6 As explained by the Bureau, these data have
been compiled since 1956, but the Bureau has been unable to locate figures
for most states since 1960. 7 Figures are not available from the Bureau for
the elapsed time between the commission of murder and executions.
Celerity figures for each year and for the five-year period are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the median elapsed time for all states
combined varies only slightly from year to year. In contrast, figures vary
substantially for states each year, and for the five-year period. For a number
of states for individual years, and for some states for all five years (n = 9),
median figures could not be computed since there were no executions for
murder these years.
Figures in Table 1 were initially used to compute two measures of
celerity: the average median elapsed time between sentence of death and
execution between (1) 1956 and 1960, and (2) 1958 and 1960. 8 Both measures
were considered on the assumption that the public's impression of the
delay in executions is more a result of sentencing and execution practices
over the past few years than during any one year. Analysis revealed a
rather substantial association between these two measures (r = .707), and
a very similar association between celerity figures lagged by one year
(1959) and average figures for 1956 to 1960 (r = .900), and for 1958 to 1960
(r = .907). 9 In addition, the results of the analysis (to be presented later)
were virtually identical regardless of which celerity measure was selected.
As a result, and to extend degrees of freedom, I choose to use median figures for the period 1956 to 1960 (n = 31) rather than 1958 to 1960 (n = 25). 10
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT

Certainty and severity of imprisonment for homicide are considered as
control variables. Using figures published by the Federal Bureaus of Investigation and Prisons, estimates of the certainty of imprisonment for 1960
were computed for each state by dividing the number of convicted mur-

Table 1. MEDIAN ELAPSED TIME IN MONTHS BETWEEN SENTENCE OF DEATH AND
EXECUTION OF CONVICTED MURDERERS BY STATE AND YEAR OF EXECUTION
1956

State

1957

A I abama

13.6

Arizona

22.2

1958

1959

1960

11.6

16.8

14.0

46.6

17.6

20.7

26.8

11.4

18.0

14.7

51.7

16.2

13. 1

22.8

67.4

Arkansas

California*

19.4

13.8

Colorado

18.4

7. 9

Connecticut

57.4

34.7

31.2
46. 1
26.9

Florida

24.5

29.6

36.4

24.7

19.4

Georgi a**

11.9

10.3

14.7

9. 0

2. 0

10.4

Idaho

1956- 1960***

9. 6
10.4
36.9

Illinois
Indiana

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

18.2

Louisiana

23.3

18.2
24.0

12.3

19.9
12.2

11.3

Maryland

11.8

Massachusetts
Mississippi

7. 8

24. 1

20.6

29.9

19. 1

19. 1

Hi ssouri

12.6

Nebraska

12.6
22.0

Nevada

22.0

New Hampshire

29. 1

New Jersey

29.1

New Mexico

16.4

New York

10.8

North Carol ina

23.7

Ohio*

13.2

6. 8

Ok I ahoma

14.6

16.6

21.4

19.2

20.5

18.5

18.2

14.4

16.8

21.7

22.3

15.2

15.4

15.5

17.6

11.5
12. 1

Oregon

Pennsylvania

14.1

South Carolina

11.1

21.1

28. 1

16.5

21.8

South Dakota

3. 3

Texas

6. 6

8.0

2. 4

16.9

78. 7

Utah

10.6

10.6

Tennessee

2. 9

4. 6

27.4

41.0

Vermont

2.0

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

28.7

2. 1

5. 4

28.2

3. 8

7. 3

20.0

15.3

13.6

15. 1

6. 2

1.2

19.4
10.4

Wyoming
All states

14.0

13.5

*The median time lapsed is computed on the basis of

15.4
11

14.4

date first received in

prison'' to execution.
In Ca I i forn i a the number of days between sentencing and
delivery to prison was small, seldom more than a weekend.
For Ohio the delay was

also quite brief. generally 1 to 5 days. Accordingly. for these two states these
short delays should have relatively little impact on the monthly median figures.
**Georgia officials indicate that in some cases the sentencing date was reported
and in some cases the date received at prison was reported in c..omputing median
figures. The median time lapse figures for this state are thus understated to some
unknown degree.
**"'The arithmetic mean of the median figures from 1956 to 1960 are reported in
this column.

derers imprisoned during the year by the number of reported murders
during the year. Because required imprisonment data are only available for
one year (1960) during the period where celerity data are available, analysis
is confined to 1960.
The measure used for severity of imprisonment for homicide is the
median length of prison sentence served by convicted murderers released
from prison in 1960. These median data were also secured from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, and are also only available for one year (1960) during
the 1956 to 1960 period.
For the 40 states shown in Table 1, estimates of certainty of imprisonment could be computed for all but one jurisdiction (New Jersey), and
for all but three states (New Jersey, Idaho, Wyoming) for the severity of
imprisonment. Certainty and severity estimates could not be computed for
New Jersey due to New Jersey officials' failure to report the required data.
Severity estimates were not possible for Idaho and Wyoming since there
were no murderers released from prison during the year.
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES

To control for possible spuriousness, a number of sociodemographic factors
were considered as control variables: (1) population; (2) population density;
(3) proportion urban population; (4) proportion nonwhite population; (5)
proportion male population; (6) proportion population 20-40 years of age;
(7) median education; (8) median family income; (9) percentage unemployment; and (10) a binary southemess variable, where southern states = 1
and nonsouthern = 0. 11
Due to the association among some of these variables (multicollinearity), all of the sociodemographic factors could not be considered in
the final model. To eliminate redundant variables, homicide rates were
regressed against the four sanction variables and various combinations of
sociodemographic variables. This procedure resulted in the selection of
four control variables to include in the final model: nonwhite population; urban population; population 20-40 years of age; and median family
income.
To check that an important factor among the remaining six sociodemographic variables had not been mistakenly excluded, each, one at a
time, was combined with the four sanction and four selected control variables and included in a series of regressions. This procedure failed to add
significantly to the size of the multiple R 2 value, with the execution and
imprisonment coefficients being altered only slightly and insignificantly. 12

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The general model examined here is
HR

= f (EXRT, EXCEL, CERT,

SEV, AGE, INC, NW, URB).

This model represents the hypothesis that homicide rates (HR) are influenced by execution rates (EXRT), the celerity of execution (EXCEL), the
certainty of imprisonment (CERT), the length of prison sentence (SEV),
and the sociodemographic characteristics of age (AGE), median family
income (INC), nonwhite population (NW), and urban population (URB).
Ordinary least-squares regressions were performed to examine the
hypotheses of (1) a significant inverse relationship between state homicide
rates and the certainty of executions, and the certainty and severity of
imprisonment, and (2) a positive relationship between delays in execution
and homicide rates. As noted, multiple execution rate measures are considered, and to explore both the immediate and possible delayed deterrent
effect of executions and imprisonment, two homicide rate measures are
considered: (1) homicide rates per 100,000 population for 1960; and (2)
mean homicide rates per 100,000 population for 1960 and 1961. 13
THE SIMULTANEITY OF THE SANCTION-OFFENSE RATE RELATIONSHIP

The sanction-offense rate model rests on the assumption that sanctions
influence homicide rates. It is plausible, however, that the level of homicides also influences sanction levels for homicide. If this is the case, our
model will yield biased results for the sanction variables.
To test this question, homicide rates for year t-1 (1959) and the
four sociodemographic variables included in our model were regressed
against the sanction variables. Like some previous investigators (Black and
Orsagh), a one-year lag was assumed in how levels of homicide might
influence sanction levels. Results fail to show sanctions to be responsive
to homicide rates. Only a very slight trade-off is observed between 1959
homicide rates and 1960 execution rates (B = .015), one-year lagged execution rates (B = .001) and three-year mean execution rates (B = .001).
Similarly, the trade-off between homicide rates and certainty (B = - .001)
and severity (B = - .001) of imprisonment is also very slight. 14 These results lead to the conclusion that the findings to be presented here are not
seriously biased due to simultaneity.

Findings
Table 2 reports the analysis when sanctions and homicide rates are examined for 1960 (upper panel), and when mean homicide rates for 1960 and

Table 2.

RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION, EXECUTION RATES, CERTAINTY AND
SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Variable

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Va Iue

2.163

Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

%nonwhite population

.225

14.658

. 143

9. 966

-.619

-. 001

-.209

.001

. 851

22.220

. 651

5. 281

.836
17. 704''

-. 276

4. 481

. 183

4. 482

1 .000

.030

-2.181

-. 114

1. 873

1.355

Severity of prison

-.594

-.010

-. 185

.007

2.087

Celerity of execution

-. 401

-.057

-. 151

. 052

1. 207

Certainty of execution

-. 031

.030

. 129

.244

1. 564

Constant

= 3. 153

%urban population
Certainty of prison

R2 =

. 828''

Adj. R2 =

. 759 1•
Mean liomicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwh i t e

popu I at ion

%urban population

. 182

9.153

. 095

9.122

1.007

-.645

-.001

-. 266

.001

1. 415

. 859

20.014

. 628

4.834

17. 144''

-.292

4.153

. 182

4.102

1. 025

-. 121

. 021

-2. 162

I. 715

1. 590

Severity of prison

-.592

-. 010

-.205

.006

2.677

Celerity of execution

-.395

-.040

-. 114

.047

. 716

Certainty of execution

-.028

.028

. 125

. 223

1. 522

Certainty of prison

Constant =

5. 016

R2 =

. 835*

Adj. R2 =

. 769''

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;

certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.

'•P

< • 001.

1961 are used as the dependent variable (lower panel). For both measures
of homicide, analysis reveals a consistent pattern. When 1960 offense rates
are considered, the partial regression (B) coefficients fall in the predicted
negative direction for the certainty (-2.181) and severity (- .010) of imprisonment, but not for the certainty of executions (.030). In addition, the
celerity coefficient is negative ( - .057), whereas the deterrence argument
suggests a positive association between the length of the interval between
sentencing and execution and homicide rates. None of the sanction coefficients is statistically significant.
When mean homicide rates are examined, the coefficients are nega-

tive for the certainty ( - 2.162) and severity ( - .010) of imprisonment,
and for the celerity of the death penalty ( - .040), but positive for execution
rates (.028). Table 2 also shows that sizes of the respective coefficients are
very comparable for the sanction variables in the yearly and mean homicide rate analysis.
These findings provide no support for the deterrence hypothesis for
the certainty and celerity of the death penalty. The nonsignificant findings
for the certainty and severity of imprisonment are also inconsistent with
the deterrence argument.
Table 3 presents the results when a one-year lagged execution rate
Table3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION, ONE-YEAR LAGGED EXECUTION RATES,
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Variable

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Va Iue

Homicide Rate Resu 1 ts

% age 20-40 years
Median income

%nonwhite population

% urban population
Certainty of prison
Severity of prison

0225

14.404

0140

9. 901

-.619

-.001

-.202

0001

0851

22 0418

.657

5. 265

2. 116
0790
18. 129*

-.276

4 0379

0179

4. 458

.965

0030

-~.329

-0 122

1.880

1 0535

-.594

-.010

-.182

.007

~-

057

Celerity of execution

-0 401

-.064

-0172

0053

1.464

Certainty of execution

-. 068

0259

0146

0192

1.809

Constant
R2

Adj. R2

=

=
=

3.332
.830*
0762*

Mean Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwh i t e

popu I at ion

%urban population

Certainty of prison

0182

8.913

.093

9.086

.963

-.645

-0 001

-.260

.001

1 0360

.859

20.167

.632

4. 832

17.422*

-0 292

4.066

.178

4. 091

.988

.021

-2.283

-0 128

1. 725

1 0752

Severity of prison

-0 592

-.010

-.203

.006

2.654

Celerity of execution

-.395

-.046

-. 131

0049

.890

Certainty of execution

-.069

.227

0137

.177

1. 654

Constant
R2

Adj. R2

=

=
=

5.182
.836*
0771*

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;
certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.
*P < .001.

measure is considered. The 1960 homicide rate analysis yields negative
coefficients for the certainty ( - 2.329) and severity ( - .010) of imprisonment, and for the celerity of executions ( - .064). The coefficients are also
negative in the mean homicide rate analysis for the certainty ( - 2.283) and
severity ( - .010) of imprisonment, and the celerity of the death penalty
( - .046). As before, neither the imprisonment nor the celerity coefficient is
statistically significant.
In contrast, lagged execution rates are positively associated with
yearly (B = .259) and mean homicide rates (B = .227). Accordingly, we
again find no evidence that homicide rates are responsive to the death
penalty.
Three-year mean execution rates are introduced into the analysis
reported in Table 4. For each measure of homicide, the coefficients are
consistently negative for both imprisonment variables and the celerity of
the death penalty. In contrast, execution rates and both measures of homicide are positively related, although the coefficients are again not statistically
significant.
In sum, these findings provide no support for the deterrence argument for the certainty of the death penalty, with homicide rates being
positively related with each measure of execution. Second, both homicide
rates are negatively related to the celerity of the death penalty, but the
celerity coefficients are very slight and are not significant. Accordingly, no
support is found for the argument that delays in execution are positively
related with homicide rates. Third, although certainty and severity of imprisonment are negatively associated with both measures of homicide, the
findings are not statistically significant.
Finally, while not of primary interest, comparison of the findings for
the sanction versus the sociodemographic variables also reveals a rather
consistent pattern. The Beta results consistently show nonwhite population
to be the best predictor of offense rates, followed by median family income.
Next comes severity of imprisonment, which ranks third in importance in
four of the six analyses, then followed by urban population, which ranks
fourth in four of the six analyses. These factors are followed by the two
execution variables, and lastly by age and certainty of imprisonment, which
prove to be the poorest predictors of homicide. These results are consistent
with the findings of most previous investigations that homicide rates are
more responsive to sociodemographic factors (nonwhite, income, urban)
than imprisonment (certainty and severity), and are not responsive to executions (certainty, celerity).
NONLINEARITY OF THE SANCTION-OFFENSE RATE RELATIONSHIP

In the foregoing analysis the form of the relationship between the sanction
and offense variables was assumed to be linear. But there is a possibility

Teble4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION. THREE-YEAR MEAN EXECUTION RATES.
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT. SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Variable

Beta Coeff.

SE

~

Value

Homicide Rate Results

%age 20-40

years

Hed ian income

%nonwhite population
%urban population

.225
-.619

17.058
-.001

-. 223

.166

. 851
-.276

21.422

.628

4. 728

. 193

9.838
.001

3.007
1.016

5.093
4.354

17 .692*
1.179
1. 733
1.340

.030

-2.412

-.594

- .oo8

-. 126
-. 148

1. 832

Severity of prison
Celerity of execution

-. 401

-.067

-.179

. 051

. 145

.795

. 176

. 471

Certainty of prison

Certainty of execution

. 007

1. 735
2.848

Constant = 2. 524
R2 =

.838*

Adj. R2 =

. 773*
Mean Homicide Rate

% age 20-40 years

.182

1. 548

.605
.191

4.681

16.984*

4. 002

1.194

-2.357
-.008

-.132

1.684

-. 171

. 006

1.959
1.847

-. 048

-. 138
.166

.046

Median income

-.645

%nonwhite population

.859
-.292

19.293

Certainty of prison

.021

Severity of prison

-. 592

Celerity of execution
Certainty of execution

-.395
. 147

Constant

4.470

%urban population

R2 =

.843*

Adj. R2 =

. 780*

Results

9. 043
.001

11. 252
-.001
4.373

.700

. 117
-.280

.433

1 .657

1 .074
2. 612

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;
certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.

*P

< .

001.

that the actual form of the relationship is nonlinear. To provide a test of this
question, natural log transforms were performed on the homidde rate
variables and the above analysis was repeated.
Table 5 reports the analysis when both the sanction variables and
the transformed homidde rates are examined for 1960, and when transformed mean homicide rates are used as the dependent variable. This
analysis reveals similar findings but there are some points of contrast to
Table 2. With the exception of execution rates, each of the sanction variables is negatively related with both homidde measures. Likewise, neither

Table 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION, EXECUTION RATES, CERTAINTY AND
SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
LOG HOMICIDE RATES
Independent Variable

B Coeff.

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Value

Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite population
% urban population
Certainty of prison

. 173

2.824

. 117

2.762

-.425

-. 001

-. 051

.000

.]28

4.823

. 601

1. 463

10.861"*

-. 091

1.881

.327

1. 242

2.294

1. 045
. 036

. 031

-. 526

-. 117

.519

1 .025

Severity of prison

-. 652

-.003

-. 236

.002

2.448

Celerity of execution

-.500

-. 032

-.360

.014

4. 907*

Certainty of execution

-.007

.010

.181

.068

2.206

. 423

Constant
R2·

Adj. R2

=
=
=

.413
. 761'"'""'
. 665'"""'

Mean Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite popu 1at ion

. 140

1.486

. 070

2.284

-.505

-.001

-.100

.000

. 158

. 771

4.316

.609

1.210

12. 713*''

% urban popu I at ion

-.166

1 .305

. 257

1 .027

1 .613

Certainty of prison

-. 020

-.680

-. 171

.429

2. 509

Severity of prison

-.649

-. 003

-.254

.002

3. 245

Celerity of execution

-. 461

-.023

-. 302

. 012

3.944

Certainty of execution

-.021

.008

. 173

.056

2.309

Constant
R2

Adj. R2

=
=
=

1.171
. 791 ,,,,,
. 707**''

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;
certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B. 1., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.
*~

< .05.

**p < • 01.
1'"'-P

< • 001.

the certainty and severity of imprisonment nor the certainty of execution is
significantly related with either measure of homicide. Importantly, and in
contrast to Table 2, celerity of death penalty is now negatively and significantly related with yearly homicide rates.
Table 6 reports the results of the log analysis when one-year lagged
execution rates are considered. Execution rates and both homicide rates are
again positively associated, and the certainty and severity of imprisonment, and the celerity of the death penalty, are negatively associated with

Table 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION. ONE-YEAR LAGGED EXECUTION RATES.
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT. SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
LOG HOMICIDE RATES
8 Coeff.

Independent Variable

Beta Coeff.

SE

Value

F

Homicide Rate Resu Its

% age 20-40 years

. 173

2.735

. 113

2. 751

-.425

-. 001

-.044

.000

. 728

4.876

.608

1. 463

-. 091

1. 850

. 322

1. 239

Certainty of prison

. 031

-.568

-.126

. 522

1.182

Severity of prison

-. 652

-.003

-. 234

. 002

2.427

Celerity of execution

-.450

-. 034

-. 384

.015

5. 236•'

Certainty of execution

-. 052

.082

. 197

.053

2.344

.382

Median income

% nonwhite population
% urban population

.988
.026
11 .107**
2.231

= .474
= . 762***
Adj. R2 = . 667•'**

Constant

R2

Mean Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite

% urban

popu I at ion

. 140

1.409

.066

2.279

-.505

-. 001

-.093

.000

. 771

4. 356

. 614

1. 212

. 138
12.915**

-.166

1. 279

.252

1 .026

1. 554

Certainty of prison

-.020

-.713

-.179

. 433

2.719

Severity of prison

-.649

-.003

-.253

.002

3.226

Celerity of execution

-. 461

-.025

-. 323

. 012

4. 221

Certainty of execution

-. 072

.068

. 185

. 044

2.367

popu I at ion

= 1. 223
= . 791 '''"'
Adj. R2 = . 708•''"'

Constant

R2

Sources:

Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from

Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;

certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and

demographic data from U.S. Department of Corrrnerce, 1964.
~':p

< • 05.

''*P < • 01.
*''*P < • 001 .

the two dependent variables. With the exception of the celerity of execution1960 homicide rate relationship, the sanction coefficients are not statistically significant. Except for the significant results for the celerity variable in
the yearly analysis, these findings closely parallel those in Table 3.
Table 7 reports the results when three-year mean execution rates are
considered in the log analysis. As before, we observe a consistent pattern
for celerity, but with both celerity coefficients being negative and significant (P < .05). In contrast, the coefficients are negative for the two impris-

Table 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION. THREE-YEAR MEAN EXECUTION RATES.
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
LOG HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Variable

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Value

Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite population

% urban

population

Certainty of prison

. 173

3.470

. 144

2.765

-. 425

-. 001

-. 073

.000

.728

4.560

.569

1. 431

-. 091

1. 956

.340

1. 224

2. 554

.031

-. 573
-.002

-. 127
-.197

. 515
. 002

1. 239

-.033
.225

-.380
.212

.014
. 132

5. 493''
2.876

.095
-. 121

2. 293

.773

.000

.239

1.187

11.890'"'
1.813

Severity of prison

-. 652

Celerity of execution

-.450
.159

Certainty of execution
Constant
R2

Adj. R2

=
=

11.575
.076
10. 150'"'

1.658

.251
. 768*'"'
. 675'"'*
Mean Homicide Rate Results

.140

2.016

Median income

-. 505

-. 001

% nonwhite popu I at ion

. 771
-.166

4.094
1. 367

. 577
.269

Certainty of prison

-.020

-.717

-.180

. 427

2.818

Severity of prison

-.649

-.002

-.219

.002

2. 319

Celerity of execution

-. 461

-.025

-.318

. 012

. 145

.186

. 198

. 110

4. 387''
2.584

% age 20-40 years

% urban

population

Certainty of execution
Constant
R2

Adj. R2

=
=

1. 015

1. 040
. 796*•'*
. 714*'""'

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;
certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.
,·,p < . 05.

*•"•p < .01.
'"'''P

< • 001.

onment variables, but they are not significant. The same pattern of findings
also resulted in the earlier linear analysis (Table 4). In addition, mean
execution rates and both homicide rates are again positively related.
In sum, the nonlinear analysis also reveals rather consistent findings,
and provides no support for the deterrence argument for either the certainty and severity of imprisonment, or the certainty and celerity of the death
penalty.

AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EXECUTION RATES

The three measures of execution used to this point have all been based on
the ratio of reported homicides to executions for homicide. Ehrlich and
others have argued, however, that a more appropriate measure would be
the ratio of the number of imprisoned murderers to the number of executed
murderers. The rationale for this measure is that the public is at least
generally aware of the probability of convicted murderers being executed.
To examine this question conditional execution rates were computed
for each state by dividing the number of murderers executed during 1960
by the number of murderers imprisoned during the year. Conditional execution values were then substituted in the analysis of homicide rates (as in
Table 2) and log homicide rates (as in Table 5). Results of the first analysis
appear in Table 8.
A very similar pattern of findings results for the sanction variables
as shown in Table 2. For both measures of homicide, the coefficients are
negative for certainty and severity of imprisonment, and celerity of execution, but positive for the certainty of the death penalty. None of the sanction
coefficients is statistically significant.
Table 9 presents the same analysis, but with log homicide rates. As
before (Table 5), the signs, but not levels of significance, for the sanction
variables parallel the earlier findings. The coefficients are negative for the
certainty and severity of imprisonment and the celerity variable, but only
statistically significant for the last variable. As with the earlier findings
(Table 8), the certainty of execution coefficients are positive, but statistically
significant (P < .05).15
Although not shown here, the same pattern of mixed results for the
certainty and celerity of executions shown in Tables 8 and 9 also results
when the same linear and nonlinear analysis is performed using conditional
execution rates similar to the nonconditional one-year lagged (Tables 3 and
6), and the three-year mean (Tables 4 and 7) execution rate measures used
earlier. 16 Because the results so closely parallel the respective findings in
Tables 8 and 9, they can be summarized briefly. Conditional execution rates
and log homicide rates (but not homicide rates in their original form) are
positively and significantly related. Second, regardless of the homicide
and conditional execution measure considered, certainty and severity of
imprisonment are not significantly related to offense rates. Third, celerity
of execution does not prove to be significantly related to either measure of
homicide in their original form, but is positively and significantly related to
log homicide rates regardless of which conditional execution measure is
considered. Again, the negative sign of the celerity coefficients is opposite
from that predicted by the deterrence hypothesis.

Table 8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION, CONDITIONAL EXECUTION RATES,
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, AND
HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Va r i ab 1e

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Va I ue

2. 473

Homicide Rate Resu Its

% age 20-40 years
Median income
%nonwhite population
%urban population

Certainty of prison
Sev~~r

i ty of prison

Celerity of execution
Certainty of execution
Constant =

.225

14.967

. 146

9. 517

-.619

-. 001

-.170

.001

. 602

. 851

22. 678

.665

5. 049

20. 174'''

-.276

3.530

. 144

4. 314

.670

. 030

-I . 833

-.096

I. 078

-.594

-.009

-. 180

I. 765
. 006

-. 401

-.059

-.156

.048

I. 507

.068

. 190

. 181

.099

3. 647

2.189

2. 727

R2 =

. 843''

Adj. R2 =

. 780''
Hean Homicide Rate Resu Its

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite

popu I at ion

%urban population

. 182

9. 371

. 098

8. 827

I. 127

-.645

-. 001

-. 233

.001

I. 145
18.880*

. 859

20.347

. 638

4. 683

-. 292

3. 362

. 147

4. 001

.706

. 021

-I. 847

-. 103

I. 637

I. 272

Severity of prison

-. 592

-.010

-.202

.006

2.812

Celerity of execution

-.395

-.040

-. 114

. 044

.817

.060

. 160

. 163

. 092

2.987

Certainty of prison

Certainty of execution

Constant = 4. 680
R2 =

. 846''

Adj. R2 =

. 784'''

Sources: Homicide rate figures from F.B.I.
1961; celerity of execution figures from
Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;
certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.
7

,·,p

< . 001.

Summary and Conclusions
In this investigation I have examined a neglected, but theoretically important question; the deterrent effect of the celerity of executions on homicide
rates. Both the founders of the classical school of criminology (Beccaria,
Bentham) and more recent investigators (Geerken and Cove; Jeffery) have
emphasized the importance of the celerity of punishment as a deterrent to
crime, but this question has been ignored in death penalty research.

Table 9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CELERITY OF EXECUTION, CONDITIONAL EXECUTION RATES.
CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF IMPRISONMENT, SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES. AND
LOG HOMICIDE RATES
B Coeff.

Independent Variables

Beta Coeff.

SE

F Value

I. 211

Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite population

. 173

2. 901

. 120

2.636

-.42S

-.000

-.004

. 000

.000

. 728

4. 942

.616

I .398

12. 491''''
I. 782

-.091

I.S9S

. 277

1.19S

. 031

-.410

-.091

.489

.70S

Severity of prison

-. 6S2

-. 003

-.232

.002

2.633

Celerity of execution

% urban popu I at ion
Certainty of prison

-.sao

-. 032

-. 360

.013

s, 73S''

Certainty of execution

.111

. OS8

.234

. 027

4. 387'''

Constant

.292

R2

. 782'""'''

Adj. R2

. 69S''""'
Mean Homicide Rate Results

% age 20-40 years
Median income

% nonwhite popu I at ion

. 140

I. S48

.073

2.181

-.sos

-.000

-.OS6

.000

. 771

4. 413

. 622

1. 1S7

.so4
. OS4
14. SS2"*

% urban population

-. 166

I. 06S

.210

.988

I. 162

Certainty of prison

-.020

-·. S82

-. 147

.404

2.07S

Severity of prison

-.649

-. 003

-. 2SI

.001

3.513

Celerity of execution

-.461

-. 023

-.300

.Oil

.097

.048

.222

. 023

4. 576''
4. 486o>

Certainty of execution
Constant

Sources:

I.

071

R2

. 809'""'

Adj. R2

. 733''''''

Homicide rate figures from F.B.I., 1961; celerity of execution figures from

Bureau of the Census, Demographic Survey Division, National Prisoners Statistics Branch;

certainty and severity of imprisonment figures from Federa) Bureau of Prisons, 1960.
Execution rates were computed on the basis of homicide and execution figures that came
respectively from F.B.I., 1961, and Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1967. Socioeconomic and
demographic data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1964.

,.,P
,·,·,p

. as.
.01.

,.,.,.,p < • 001.

To explore this question, celerity and the certainty of the death penalty, and certainty and severity of imprisonment, were incorporated in an
analysis of state homicide rates for 1960. To make the analysis comparable
to previous investigations, multiple measures of execution and homicide
were considered, along with a variety of sociodemographic control variables. Linear and nonlinear forms of the sanction-offense rate relationship
were also examined. Briefly, analysis revealed the following. Severity of

imprisonment was consistently found to be inversely related with homicide
rates, but the relationship is very weak (B < - .005), and not statistically
significant.
Second, certainty of imprisonment also proved to be inversely related to homicide rates throughout the analysis, but the results are not
statistically significant. The lack of support for the certainty of imprisonment is further reflected by the size of the Beta coefficients for certainty
and severity of imprisonment. Throughout the analysis, the Betas are larger
for the latter variable.
Third, no support is found for the deterrence hypothesis for the
certainty of the death penalty. Regardless of the measures of execution and
homicide considered, and the assumed functional form of the relationship,
certainty of the death penalty consistently proved to be positively related
with offense rates. Moreover, for each conditional execution rate measure,
the certainty of execution coefficients are statistically significant.
Fourth, at odds with the deterrence hypothesis, the length of the
time interval between the sentencing and execution of convicted murderers
(celerity of execution) was consistently found to be negatively associated
with state homicide rates; states with longer time intervals between sen~
tencing and execution tend to have lower homicide rates.
These findings provide a rather consistent response to the two questions that prompted this study: (1) what is the deterrent effect of the celerity
of the death penalty on homicide rates; and (2) have the findings of previous investigations been biased by a failure to consider the celerity of the
death penalty? To both of these questions the answer is negative. No
support is found for the deterrence argument for celerity of the death
penalty, nor is there any evidence that the negative findings reported by
most investigators for the certainty of execution are due to their failure to
consider celerity.
Before ending this discussion, some possible explanations for the
negative findings for the two death penalty variables must be examined.
First, although this and previous studies have typically failed to show a
significant inverse relationship between the certainty of the death penalty
and homicide rates, it might be argued that these negative findings are
a result of the low level of executions for murder for the time periods
considered Geffery).
Although proponents of deterrence are not specific about how certain sanctions must be in order to be effective deterrents to crime, Black
and Orsagh conclude that the low level of executions for murder in this
country may be responsible for theirs, and others', negative findings for
the certainty of executions. For example, for 1960 they estimate that less
than 2 percent of convicted first-degree murderers were put to death.
Although I take issue with Black and Orsagh's 2 percent estimate
because they base it on the ratio of executions for murder to total criminal

homicides (not first-degree murders), the fact remains that a number of
capital murderers are not executed. If we assume, as Wolfgang and Ferracuti, Sutherland and Cressey and others have, that not more than 5 to 10
percent of criminal homicides are first-degree murders, then the 2 percent
figure substantially underestimates execution rates. If execution rates are
estimated on the assumption that 90 to 95 percent of criminal homicides
are not capital offenses (first-degree murders), then a more realistic estimate of the certainty of the death penalty for murder in 1960 ranges from
20 percent (if we assume that 1.0 in 10 criminal homicides are first-degree
murders) to 40 percent (if we assume that 0.5 in 10 criminal homicides are
first-degree murders). 17
These are only rough estimates of execution rates for first-degree
murder, but they do illustrate that the certainty of the death penalty for
capital homicide was much higher in 1960 than some have assumed. 18 I
must agree with Black and Orsagh, however, that this analysis cannot
address the deterrent effectiveness of the death penalty if execution rates
were raised to substantially higher levels.
The second concern about my findings is the adequacy of the celerity
measure used here. As discussed, I have only been able to use the time
interval between the sentencing and execution of convicted murderers.
Despite the negative findings for celerity, it might be argued that these
results are due to a failure to consider the more appropriate time period
between the offense behavior and execution.
Unfortunately, I can only speculate about the merit of this objection,
for there are not nationwide data for 1960 (or any other year) on the time
interval between the commission of murder and the execution of murderers. If the length of time between the commission of murder and sentencing of capital offenders was relatively uniform (a constant) from state to
state in 1960, then our measure of celerity would not yield biased results;
the average time period between murder and execution, and sentencing
and execution, would be highly correlated. If, however, the interval varied
substantially from state to state in 1960 between murders and sentencing
of convicted murderers, this analysis would result in somewhat biased
findings. (I say "somewhat" because the delay in execution after sentencing is one important contributor to the interval between the commission of
murder and execution.)
In short, it is simply not possible to know to what extent (if any) the
findings for the celerity of the death penalty are biased due to this difficulty. What is clear, however, is that no support is found for the deterrence
hypothesis when one important source of delay in executions is considered.
In conclusion, the findings of this study fall well within the pattern
of results of the vast majority of previous investigations. No support whatsoever is found for the argument that the certainty, or celerity, of the death
penalty provides an effective deterrent to murder. Although some possible

limitations of this investigation have been identified, the consistency of the
findings with earlier studies cannot be ignored. Nor can it be ignored that
not a single reputable study has yet to demonstrate the death penalty to
be a more effective deterrent to murder than alternative legal sanctions
(Baldus and Cole; Black and Orsagh; Bowers and Pierce; Passell; Passell
and Taylor; Peck; Zeisel). For these reasons, and because of the seriousness
of the issue, I feel obliged to agree with most previous investigators. The
evidence clearly suggests that the death penalty in our criminal justice
system, at least for murder, will have to be justified on grounds other than
its deterrence effectiveness.
Notes
1. It is of interest to note that in the Funnan decision of 1972 Chief Justice Burger of the United
States Supreme Court complained about the lack of clear-cut empirical evidence of a recent
vintage on the deterrent effect of the death penalty for murder. Before vacating Fowler v. North
Carolina (1976), the Supreme Court received briefs and heard oral arguments in five other
death penalty cases in which the findings of a number of post-Funnan deterrence investigations were of major concern: Roberts v. Louisiana (1976); Proffitt v. Florida (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina (1976); Jurek v. Texas (1976); Gregg v. Georgia (1976). Although the High Court
did not provide any empirical evidence in support of its belief, it did conclude that for many
murders "the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent" (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976,
185-6).
2. Black and Orsagh make the same argument for the possible bias of their results due to their
(1) possibly excluding some important nonsanction variable(s) from their model, (2) ignoring
the possible deterrent effect of informal sanctions, and (3) use of a log-linear functional form
in the analysis.
3. Both Gibbs (a, b) and Andenaes take issue with persons like Jeffrey and Geerken and Cove
who base their claims of the deterrent effectiveness of the celerity of legal sanctions upon the
findings of psychological laboratory research. As Andenaes argues, analogies drawn from
such experimental research to general deterrence are seriously flawed due to the important
"differences between the life situation and the experimental setting" (188). To illustrate,
whereas laboratory research has been almost exclusively concerned with the effects of actual
punishment on experimental subjects, the important question for general deterrence is the
effect of the threat of punishment on would-be offenders. In addition, Gibbs (a, 131) further
questions the contribution of laboratory research to a better understanding of "specific deterrence" due to the dissimilarity between the laboratory experiment (the setting, subjects and
sanctions) and factors of importance to the theory of specific deterrence.
4. Although first-degree murder typically includes the elements of premeditation and malice
aforethought, the homicide offense category used by the F.B.I. is much more inclusive; it
includes all willful felonious homicides as distinguished from deaths caused by negligence.
5. To illustrate, the bivariate correlations between state execution rates for the five-year periods leading up to 1967 and 1968 and (1) first-degree murder rates for these years {1967,
r = - .137; 1968, r = - .194), and (2) F.B.I homicide rates for these years (1967, r = - .166;
1968, r = - .194) are very comparable (Bailey, a, b).
6. Celerity data were supplied to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (which had the responsibility
for collecting these data between 1956 and 1971) by state departments of corrections on an
individual case basis. Median figures were then computed by the Bureau for each state for
each year (see Table 1). The National Prisoners Statistics Branch of the Bureau of the Census
has assured me that these data have been checked, and double checked, to guarantee their
accuracy.
I would like to express my appreciation to Matthew G. Yeager, Chief Criminologist of
the House Subcommittee on Crime, and to the House Subcommittee for their kind assistance
in doing much of the leg-work that made it possible to secure celerity of execution data from
the Bureau of the Census.

7. I have, however, been promised additional celerity figures for the years after 1960 when
these data are located.
8. Unfortunately, state data for individual cases for the elapsed time between sentencing and
execution are not available from the Bureau of the Census. Accordingly, it was not possible to
compute median celerity figures for the states on an individual case basis for the periods 1956
to 1960 and 1958 to 1960. Rather, celerity figures for states had to be computed for these time
periods by averaging yearly data for the respective periods.
9. For neighboring years during the period 1956 to 1960, correlations between yearly celerity
figures are: 1956 and 1957 (r = .518); 1957 and 1958 (r = .558); 1958 and 1959 (r = .449); 1959
and 1960 (r = .837). Especially noting the more substantial correlation for the 1959 to 1960
period, the relatively consistent size of the year-to-year coefficients would suggest that the
elapsed time between sentencing and execution is more than simply a "random" variable.
10. Although the concern here is with the deterrent effect of the celerity of executions, and
not correlates of celerity, it is of interest to note how this factor relates to the other variables
considered in the analysis. The correlations between celerity estimates for the 1956 to 1960
period and the sociodemographic variables are: urban population (r = .056); nonwhite population (r = - .224); population 20 to 40 years of age (r = - .030); median family income
(r = .503). The correlations for .the imprisonment and execution rate variables considered in
Tables 2-9 are: certainty of imprisonment (r = - .013); severity of imprisonment (r = .504);
execution rates (r = .370); one-year lagged execution rates (r = .458}; three-year mean execution rates (r = .305); conditional execution rates (r = .099).
Although the bivariate correlations are statistically significant between celerity and
some of these variables (family income, P < .01; severity of imprisonment, P < .02; execution
rates, P < .OS; one-year lagged execution rates, P < .01}, celerity of execution does not prove
to be so collinear with these factors that they cannot be considered in the same equation. To
illustrate, for the variables of primary interest here, the standard errors shown in Table 2 for
the execution rate and celerity of executions variables are quite low. A similar pattern holds
throughout the remainder of the analysis (Tables 3-9).
11. No explicit theory of homicide is reflected in the sociodemographic variables chosen for
the analysis. (No adequate theory of variation in homicide rates can be found in the criminology literature.) Rather, sociodemographic variables were chosen on the basis of their use
in previous deterrence and death penalty research, which will thus better allow us to compare
our findings with those of previous studies.
12. Regardless of the additional sociodemographic variables considered, nonwhite population
continues to be significantly (P < .001) related with homicide rates, and the best predictor of
the dependent variable.
13. Forst and Black and Orsagh make an argument for the use of weighted regressions in their
analyses because the variance in homicide rates is often larger in more populated states
(heteroscedasticity), which results in biased standard errors and tests of significance. In neither
investigation, however, is heteroscedasticity found to be a problem, with Black and Orsagh,
for example, only finding a very slight inverse relationship (r = - .03) between state population and the size of the residuals.
In this investigation as well, heteroscedasticity does not provide a difficulty. When
population size and the residuals resulting from various combinations of execution and homicide rates were correlated, the coefficients also proved to be low-negative, and not significantly different from zero.
14. Due to the time period considered with the celerity of execution variable (1956-60}, this
factor was not included in our analysis of the effect of homicide rates for the previous year
(1959) on sanction levels for the next year (1960).
15. It is of interest to note that for the first time in the analysis, Table 9 shows both execution
variables to be statistically significant, but the signs of the coefficients are in the opposite
direction than the deterrence doctrine would predict. This unexpected result would not appear
to be a function-a statistical artifact-of the relationship between celerity and conditional
execution rates (r = .309, P > .05). The lack of collinearity between these two variables is also
indicated by their low standard errors.
16. One-year lagged conditional execution rates were computed by dividing (1) the number of
executions for murder in 1961 by (2) the number of convicted murderers imprisoned in 1960.
Three-year mean conditional execution rates were computed by dividing (1) the average

yearly number of executions for the period 1959-1961 by (2) the number of convicted murderers imprisoned in 1960.
17. To illustrate how these percentage figures were derived, assume that in 1960 there was a
ratio of (1) two executions for murder, per (2) 100 criminal homicides. Comparison of these
figures (2/100) would yield the 2 percent execution rate suggested by Black and Orsagh. If,
however, only 10 percent of criminal homicides are first-degree murders (100 x 10% = 10),
then the execution rate would be 2/10, or 20 percent. Similarly, if only 5 percent of criminal
homicides are frrst-degree murders (100 x 5% = 5), then the execution rate would be 2/5, or
40 percent.
18. It was suggested by an anonymous reviewer of this article that estimates of state firstdegree murder rates like those discussed here might be substituted in the analysis so that the
results could be compared with our findings which are based upon F.B.I. figures for murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter. I have given considerable thought to this suggestion, but
have decided against such an analysis on two grounds. First, since it is possible that the ratio
of first-degree murders to total criminal homicides is not a constant from state to state, it
would be misleading to adjust all state homicide rates by either the 5 or 10 percent figure
suggested by Wolfgang and Ferracuti. Second, even if first-degree murder rates were adjusted
by 5 or 10 percent (a constant), the results of this study woul~ be essentially unchanged. It is
true that the size of the unstandardized coefficients for the sanction and other variables would
differ in such an analysis, but importantly: (1) the signs of the regression coefficients would
not change, (2) the relative size of the standardized (Beta) coefficients would remain the same,
and (3) the level of significance (F -values) associated with each variable would not be altered.
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